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POWER TO THE PEOPLE:
THE FIRsT AMENDMENT AND UTILITY OPERATING EXPENSES
In Cahill v. Public Service Commission,1 the New York Court of Ap-
peals created another theory on which ratepayers may prevent a public
utility from factoring its charitable contributions into its monthly
charges. Although courts have considered other constitutional issues in-
volving public utilities,2 Cahill marks the first case to hold that a utility's
funding of charitable causes from monthly billings violates an objecting
ratepayer's first amendment rights. While the decision opens a new judi-
cial avenue for ratepayers to reign in utility rates, it also may close utili-
ties' coffers to increasingly desperate private charitable organizations.3
States extensively regulate public utilities because of their natural mo-
nopoly status.4 States employ utility commissions to set rates and place
1. 76 N.Y.2d 102, 556 N.E.2d 133, 556 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1990).
2. See, eg., Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (regulatory
agency constitutionally may not prevent utility from including political editorials in utility billing
envelopes); Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(regulatory agency constitutionally may not require utility to include political statements opposed to
the utility's positions in billing envelopes). The Supreme Court considered a ratepayer's fifth and
fourteenth amendment claims against a public utility in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 256-57 (1974). However, the Court did not reach the merits, holding that the plaintiff
failed to establish that the alleged unconstitutional behavior involved state action. See infra, note 34
and accompanying text for an explanation of how the plaintiff in Cahill successfully established state
action.
3. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
4. A natural monopoly exists when one firm can produce a good or service more cheaply than
multiple firms. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 399 F.2d 953, 965 n.19 (D.C.
Cir. 1968). States substantially regulate natural monopoly firms because of their inherent economic
power. Fanfara, Suelflow, & Draba, Energy and Competition: The Saga of Electric Power, 25 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 125, 126-27 (1980). However, courts generally permit natural monopoly firms to com-
pete fairly in such one-firm markets. Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373, 378
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582,
584 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1960) ("A market may, for example, be so limited that it is impossible to produce
at all and to meet the cost of production except by a plant large enough to supply the whole de-
mand.") (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945)).
Natural monopolies arise when start-up costs are large compared to operating costs. A firm in
such a market must do a huge volume of business to recover its initial investment and earn a profit.
For an excellent introduction to natural monopoly theory, see H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 31-36; R. SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES 3
(1979). Three general categories of businesses have been identified as "public utilities:" (1) transpor-
tation and related services, including railroads, bus lines, and pipelines; (2) communications services,
including telephone and telegraph services; and (3) home, commercial, and industrial service utili-
ties, including power and light service, water supply, and sewage facilities. WELCH, CASES AND
TExT ON PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 2 (1968).
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other restrictions on the utilities' business conduct. Normally, a commis-
sion sets the utility rate approximately equal to the cost of delivering
service plus a reasonable rate of return on investment for the utilities'
shareholders.' Commissions usually impose two types of restrictions on
utilities' political and charitable expenditures: bans and allocations of
expenditures to shareholders. While Courts have rejected complete
bans,6 they generally have accepted the commissions' "allocation" meth-
ods7 of restricting public utility expenditures. For example, in El Paso
Electric Co. v. New Mexico Public Service Commission,8 the New Mexico
Supreme Court upheld the commission's prohibition on utilities' charg-
5. Harrison, Public Utilities and the First Amendment: The Economics and Ideology of Pacific
Gas & Electric, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 319, 324 (1986).
6. In Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a Commission order prohibiting public utilities from including political
editorials in their billing envelopes. Id. at 533-544. The Court held that such an outright prohibi-
tion violated the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 544. The Court reasoned that the framers
of the Bill of Rights intended the first amendment to protect all political discourse regardless of
whether it emanated from a corporation. Id. at 533. Moreover, the Court found that the Commis-
sion's order did not further a compelling state interest. Id. at 541-42.
The Court also found the ban too broad to achieve the legitimate state interest of preventing
forced subsidy of the utility's political views. Id. at 543. The Court observed in dicta that the
Commission could have ordered the utility to allocate the cost of billing inserts to the shareholders
rather than ratepayers.
The Consolidated Edison court also indicated in dicta that the Public Service Commission might
have the authority to order utilities to include billing inserts from organizations opposed to the
utilities' views. Id. at 543. However, a fragmented Supreme Court later struck down such an order
in Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986). Pacific Gas involved a
California Public Utility Commission order permitting a utility watchdog group to place fund raising
and other announcements in the utility's billing envelopes four times a year. 475 U.S. at 1. The
Supreme Court vacated the order, holding that it violated the utility's free speech rights. Id. at 1-2.
The plurality reasoned that, because it granted access only to organizations generally opposed to the
utility's political views, the order had two unconstitutional effects. Id. at 2. First, the order bur-
dened the utility by requiring it to disseminate information adverse to its own views. Id. at 2, 12-15.
Second, the plurality found that the order effectively forced the utility to respond to the watchdog
group's inserts, thus unconstitutionally compelling speech. Id. at 2, 15-18.
Commentators have heavily criticized Pacific Gas for its questionable exposition of first amend-
ment theory. See Tilner, Government Compulsion of Corporate Speech: Legitimate Regulation or
First Amendment Violation? A Critique ofPG & E, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 485 (1987); Harrison,
supra note 4, at 332-40; Note, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. California Public Utilities Commission:
Property in an Envelope, 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 229 (1987); Comment, Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public
Utilities Commission of California: Negative First Amendment Rights for Corporations, 15 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 371 (1988).
7. A utility commission allocates an expense to shareholders by denying the utility permission
to bill ratepayers for the expense. If the utility still decides to incur the expense, it must charge the
expense to its shareholders in the form of reduced dividend payments. Harrison, supra note 8, at
325.
8. 103 N.M. 300, 706 P.2d 511 (1985).
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ing certain advertising and lobbying expenses to ratepayers.9 The court
held that utilities may include in their rates only those reasonable ex-
penses that directly benefit ratepayers."° The order withstood constitu-
tional scrutiny because it did not ban speech. Instead, it merely
restricted the utilities' ability to charge ratepayers for the cost of dissemi-
nating the utilities' views."1
Two principal theories have emerged for allocating utility expenses.12
9. 103 N.M. at 302, 706 P.2d at 513.
10. Id. See, eg., Detroit Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 127 Mich. App. 499, 342
N W,2d 273 (1983); Providence Gas Co. v. Burman, 376 A.2d 687 (LI. 1977).
11. El Paso, 103 N.M. at 304, 706 P.2d at 515. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Com-
merce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990). In Austin, the Supreme Court upheld a campaign spending limitation
statute against first amendment attack. Id. at 1396. Although the statute burdened political expres-
sion, the Court reasoned that the state's compelling interest in preventing corruption justified the
burden. Id. at 1396-98. The statute did not ban corporate political expenditures outright; rather, it
allowed a corporation to make such expenditures only through a fund segregated from the general
corporate treasury. Id. at 1395. The Court concluded that the statute was sufficiently narrowly
tailored to achieve the state's compelling purpose. Id. at 1395, 1398-1400.
The El Paso court also found that the Commission's order was reasonably tailored to fulfill the
Commission's statutory obligation to set reasonable rates. El Paso, 103 N.M. at 303-04, 706 P.2d at
514-15 (affirming the district court). The order divided advertising into permissible and impermissi-
ble expenses. Permissible expenses included any expense that:
(a) Advises the ratepayers of matters of public safety, health or emergency situations;
(b) Advocates to ratepayer [sic] through factual data and advice their conservation of en-
ergy resources and reduction of peak demand;
(c) Explains utility billing practices, services, and rates to ratepayers;
(d) Must be filed with governmental agencies or financial institutions (including annual
reports, and stock prospectuses), other than advertisements filed pursuant to (f) below;
(e) Advises customers of employment opportunities with the utility company;
(f) Provides information required to be made available to customers or stockholders under
State or Federal law and regulation; or
(g) Otherwise results in a measurable reduction of operating costs and more efficient utility
service to ratepayers except as excluded by... (that part of the order setting forth imper-
missible expenditures).
Public Service Commission General Order 31 § IV.A.2. Impermissible expenditures included those
that:
(a) Promote increases in the usage of energy or utility services;
(b) Except as required by State or Federal law or regulations, promote the sale of any
goods or services from any specific company, including, but not limited to, the utility com-
pany or any subsidiary or affiliated company;
(c) Seek to establish a favorable public image of the company, other than by identifying it
as the source of an allowable advertising expenditure...
(d) Advocate a position rather than providing factual information in any (allowable) adver-
tisement ... ; or
(e) Justify a request for higher rates, or the need for plant expansion, or for any particular
addition to plant or service costs.
Public Service Commission General Order 31, § IV.A.3.
12. See supra notes 2, 6 and accompanying text for an approach to limiting utility expenditures
that the Supreme Court expressly rejected.
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First, the taxation theory holds that utility expenditures charged to rate-
payers, which are unrelated to service, are in effect a form of taxation
without representation. 13 This theory rests on the monoplistic nature of
the utility business; 4 individual ratepayers can neither do without a utili-
tys service nor obtain it elsewhere. 5 Accordingly, ratepayers have no
recourse when a utility decides to be "generous with ratepayers'
money.'
16
The California Supreme Court adopted the taxation theory in its influ-
ential opinion Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Com-
mission." The court assumed arguendo that utilities' charitable
donations performed a valuable public service. Additionally, restricting
those donations might cause an increase in taxes so as to address those
needs previously met by the utilities' largesse."5 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that this potential result did not authorize any utility "to ex-
tract from its customers payments in lieu of taxes."' 9 Such action
amounted to an "involuntary levy on ratepayers." 20
13. El Paso Elec. Co. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 103 N.M. 300, 706 P.2d 511 (1985);
State v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1975); State ex rel. Allain v. Mississippi
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 435 So. 2d 608, 617 (Miss. 1983); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1, 401 P.2d 353 (1965); Southern New England Tel. Co. v.
Public Utils. Comm'n, 29 Conn. Supp. 253, 282 A.2d 915 (1970). See also Cahill v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 76 N.Y.2d 102, 114, 556 N.E.2d 133, 556 N.Y.S.2d 840, 845 (1990) (Titone, J.,
concurring).
14. See supra note 4 for a brief discussion of natural monopolies and public utilities.
15. A 1973 Supreme Court decision slightly reduced the monopoly power of electric utilities.
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), involved a utility's refusal to sell power
to municipal power companies and to transfer (or "wheel") power to them through the utility's lines
from other sources. Id. The government brought suit under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
Id. The district court found that the utility had acted to foreclose competition from the municipal
power companies. Id. at 368. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 60 (D. Minn.
1971). The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding that the utility had violated § 2. 410
U.S. at 380-82.
Despite the Court's holding, the Otter Tail case has affected the monopoly position of electric
utilities only minimally. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission may only authorize wheeling
after an exhaustive fact finding procedure. See Note, Deregulating the Transmission of Electricity:
Wheeling under P. U.R.P.A. Sections 203, 204, and 205, 56 WASH. U.L.Q. 435, 449-50 (1989). Thus,
a municipal utility may compel wheeling only by winning an antitrust suit, a costly and risky pro-
cess. Id. at 452-54. See also Norton & Early, Limitations on the Obligation to Provide Access to
Electric Transmission and Distribution Lines, 5 ENERGY L.J. 47, 63 (1984).
16. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 668, 401 P.2d 353, 374, 44
Cal. Rptr. 1, 22 (1965).
17. 62 Cal. 2d 524, 401 P.2d 353, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. Courts often have used "involuntary levy" language to reject summarily utility chal-
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The second theory of utility expenditure allocation focuses on the util-
ity as a corporation.21 This theory holds that corporations have a social
obligation to engage in philanthropic pursuits.2 2 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, in New England Telephone & Telegraph v. De-
partment of Public Utilities,23 imposed a corporate duty of generosity to
the communities in which they reside.24 Corporations fulfill this duty by
donating to their community's charitable organizations.25 Accordingly,
the court reasoned that such donations are reasonable operating expenses
which utilities may legitimately charge to their ratepayers.26
Other courts have adopted a qualified version of the corporate obliga-
tion rationale by allowing utilities to charge to the ratepayers only those
donations that directly benefit the utility or the ratepayers.27 Under this
rationale, utilities justify charging ratepayers for donations that benefit
them in only a broad fashion.28
In Cahill v. Public Service Commission of New York,29 the New York
Court of Appeals adopted a different theory for allocating utility spend-
lenges to regulatory authority. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 69
Ohio St. 2d 258, 23 Ohio Op. 3d 254, 431 N.E.2d 683 (1982); State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 222, 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); New England TeL & Tel. Co. v. Public
Utils. Comm'n, 390 A.2d 8 (Me. 1978); Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 359
So. 2d 776 (Ala. Civ. App.), affd, 390 So. 2d 1017 (Ala. 1978); Jewell v. Washington Utils. &
Transp. Comm'n, 585 P.2d 1167 (Wash. 1978); State v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887
(Okla. 1975).
21. For a discussion of natural monopoly theory, see supra note 5.
22. See, ag., Detroit Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 342 N.W.2d 273 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983); American Hoechest Corp. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 379 Mass. 408, 399 N.E.2d 493
(1971); United States Transit Co. v. Nunes, 99 RI. 501, 209 A.2d (1965). See also I PIEST, PRIN-
CIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 83-87 (1969).
23. 360 Mass. 443, 275 N.E.2d 493 (1971).
24. New England Telephone, 275 N.E.2d at 518-21. The court quoted from the following regu-
latory decisions: In re New York Tel. Co., 84 P.U.R.3d 321, 349-50; United Gas Pipe Line Co., 31
F.P.C. 1180, 1189; Vrtjak v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 32 P.U.R.3d 385, 387-88. New England
Telephone, 275 N.E.2d at 520. The court also cited a number of judicial decisions supporting its
contention. See, eg., In re Diamond State Tel. Co., 51 Del. 525, 149 A.2d 324 (1959); Miami v.
Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 208 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1968); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Corp.
Comm'n, 192 Kan. 39, 386 P.2d 515 (1963); Northern States Power Co. v. Board of Railroad
Comm'rs, 71 N.D. 1, 298 N.W. 423 (1941). New England TeL, 275 N.E.2d at 521.
25. New England Tel, 275 N.E.2d at 521.
26. Id. Alternatively, the court indicated it would have upheld the expenditures under the
theory that they were reasonable business expenses analogous to advertising. Id.
27. See Note, Charitable Contributions No Longer Chargeable as Operating Expenses in Misis-
sippi 4 Miss. C.L. REv. 353, 360-62 for a discussion of these "direct benefit" cases.
28. See Detroit Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 127 Mich. App. 498, 523-24, 342 N.W.2d
273, 284-85 (1983).
29. 76 N.Y.2d 102, 556 N.E.2d 133, 556 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1990).
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ing. Unlike prior opinions concerning allocation of utilities' expendi-
tures, the Cahill court avoided any discussion of a utility's implied power
of taxation or implied obligation to its community. Rather, the Cahill
court concentrated solely on ratepayers' first amendment rights.
In Cahill, a ratepayer attempted to force the Public Service Commis-
sion to rescind its order permitting utilities to charge charitable dona-
tions to their ratepayers.3" The ratepayer alleged that the Commission's
order authorized utilities to compel ratepayers to contribute to organiza-
tions with which the ratepayers might disagree,"1 and therefore violated
their first amendment rights.32
The court of appeals held the Commission's order unconstitutional on
the theory that governmentally compelled expression violates the first
30. Cahill, 556 N.E.2d at 134-35. Plaintiff brought the action under CPLR Article 78, a pro-
ceeding similar in purpose and function to a mandamus proceeding. Id. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. &
R. 78 (McKinney 1990).
31. Cahill, 556 N.E.2d at 135. A slightly fuller statement of the facts appears in a prior deci-
sion in the same litigation; see Cahill v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 69 N.Y.2d 265, 268-69, 506 N.E.2d
187, 188, 513 N.Y.S.2d 656, 656-57 (1986) (plaintiff's first amendment claim did not fail for want of
state action). See infra note 37. The court explained that the plaintiff, a Catholic, primarily objected
to those utility donations made to organizations supporting abortion rights. Cahill, 506 N.E.2d at
188.
Some have argued that the government's coerced extraction of taxes violates a taxpayer's first
amendment rights when the taxpayer objects to a cause on which the government spends tax dollars.
See, e-g., United States. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). Lee involved an Amish employer who refused
to withhold social security taxes from his employees. The employer, a farmer and carpenter, as-
serted that the social security tax system infringed his freedom of religion. Because the Amish have
a religious obligation to provide for their elders, they view the national social security system as
limiting their ability to meet this obligation. Id. at 255. The Court held that the social security
system did not infringe unconstitutionally Lee's freedom of religion. Id. at 261. The Court con-
ceded that the social security system interfered with Lee's ability freely to exercise his religion. Id.
at 256-57. However, the Court also observed that the government had a strong interest in maintain-
ing a comprehensive national insurance plan like social security. Id. at 258. The Court reasoned
that recognizing Lee's alleged religious immunity to social security taxes would create a crazy-quilt
of constitutional exemptions, potentially eviscerating the social security system. The Court also saw
no principled way of distinguishing between social security taxes and other taxes. Id. at 260. The
Court explained that "[t]he tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to chal-
lenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious be-
liefs." Id. The Court concluded that the "broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system"
precluded a holding that the infringement on Lee's religion constituted a violation of the first amend-
ment. Id. See also Lull v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir. 1979) (taxpayers not allowed to
deduct proportion of their taxes used for military spending because such expenditures do not uncon-
stitutionally infringe on taxpayer's religious beliefs), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1980).
32. Cahill, 556 N.E.2d at 135. The trial court held that the Commission's order was unconsti-
tutional and the appellate division affirmed. Id. at 137. Cahill v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 147 A.D.2d
49, 542 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1989).
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amendment no less than governmentally prohibited expression.33 The
court held that the Commission's order compelled speech by authorizing
public utilities to extract from ratepayers a subsidy for the utilities' polit-
ical expression.34 Accordingly, the court concluded that the Commis-
sion's order violated ratepayers' first amendment rights.3 5
The court first noted a long line of Supreme Court precedent holding
that the first amendment protects the right not to speak.3 6 Specifically,
the court observed that the first amendment protects an individual from
"participation in the dissemination of his State's ideological message."37
33. Cahill, 556 N.E.2d at 135. Commentators generally have referred to the right not to speak
as a negative first amendment right. See, e.g., Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Govern-
ment Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C.L. REv. 995, 1014-17 (1982). The Cahill court
cited several Supreme Court cases upholding this right. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209 (1986) (first amendment prohibits government employees' union from using dues coerced from
dissident employees under agency shop agreement for promoting ideological causes that the dissi-
dents opposed); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (patronage dismissals violate first amendment
because employee cannot be forced to support a particular candidate); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705 (1977) (state may not compel individual to display motto on license plate with which he does not
agree); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (students required to
attend public school may not be forced to say pledge of allegiance). See also Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990), discussed supra at note 11; Ellis v. Brotherhood of
Ry, Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984) (union expenditures beyond those necessary to union's function as a
collective bargaining agent violate dissenting employees first amendment rights where employees
work in agency shop). But cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 442 U.S. 74 (1980) (state
provisions construed to permit petitioning and handbilling on shopping center premises do not vio-
late shopping center owners' negative first amendment rights because owner has invited public to use
his premises).
34. Cahill, 556 N.E.2d at 136.
35. Id. at 134.
36. Id. at 135. See supra note 33 for Supreme Court cases on which the New York Court of
Appeals relied.
37. Cahill, 556 N.E.2d at 135 (discussing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 605). Note that in
Cahill, the ratepayer objected to the utility's ideological message, not the state's. Purely private
conduct does not infringe an individual's constitutional rights. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11
(1883). In order for a plaintiff to demonstrate that a constitutional violation has occurred, the plain-
tiff must demonstrate some form of state involvement in the action. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 356-57. A state's heavy regulation of a private actor does not automatically
transform private conduct into state action. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350. See also San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm'n, 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (United State Olympic
Committee, to which Congress granted corporate charter and extensive funds, is not state actor);
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1981) (private non-profit school heavily funded by state and
with which state has extensive contractual relations is not state actor); Blum v. Yaretsky, 451 U.S.
991 (1981) (nursing home subject to state regulation is not state actor); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149 (1978) (trustee who sells goods for purposes of executing lien is not state actor); cf. Lugar v.
Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (private party acting pursuant to a constitutionally defective
statute is state actor).
The ratepayer in Cahill cleared the state action hurdle by challenging the Public Service Commis-
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The court analogized Cahill's situation to that of the plaintiffs in
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education." In Abood, the Supreme Court
ruled that a government employees' union constitutionally could not
spend general union dues on political causes to which some employees
objected when payment of union dues was a condition of employment. 39
The Court concluded that the union could use its general dues solely to
perform functions germane to its collective bargaining duties.' The
Court in Abood explained that the state had a compelling interest in fur-
thering industrial peace, and thus unions permissibly could spend funds
only to further that objective.41
The Cahill court viewed the utility charges as compelled payments
that, like the union dues in Abood, financed causes repugnant to the rate-
payer. While the objecting employees in Abood faced termination if they
refused to pay their dues, the Cahill court observed that the conse-
sion's order rather than the utility's charitable donations made pursuant to the order. Cahill, 506
N.E.2d 187 at 189-90. The court stressed that the issue was "not the conduct of the utility officials,
but the policy and directives of the PSC in establishing utility rates which include charitable contri-
butions as operating expenses." Cahill, 506 N.E.2d at 190 (emphasis in original).
38. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
39. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36. The Abood labor contract in which payment of union dues is a
condition of employment created an "agency shop." In Railway Employees Dept. v. Hanson, 351
U.S. 225 (1956), a precursor to Abood, the Court confronted a "union shop" agreement, in which
union membership is a condition of continued employment. See infra note 41.
Union and agency shop agreements are two types of "union security" arrangements. Such ar-
rangements prevent an employer from breaking a union by hiring nonunion workers or by coercing
employees into refusing to pay union dues. See R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 639 (1976). The
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of union security arrangements in Hanson, 351 U.S. at
238; see infra, note 41. Abood, by contrast, involved a successful challenge to union expenditure of
funds extracted under a valid union security agreement.
40. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36.
41. The Court in Abood relied heavily on Railway Employees Dept v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225
(1956). Hanson involved a union shop agreement made pursuant to § 2, Eleventh, of the Railway
Labor Act. 351 U.S. at 228 & n.2. Nonunion employees challenged the agreement, inter alla, as
violative of their first amendment rights. Id. at 236-37. The Court held the agreement constitu-
tional. Id. at 238. The Court began its analysis by observing that the commerce clause granted
Congress wide latitude to regulate labor relations. Id. at 233. The Court reasoned that the power to
make policy decisions concerning how best to effect industrial peace is included in this congressional
power. Id. The Court observed that Congress made just such a decision when it authorized union
shop agreements under § 2, Eleventh. Id. at 233-34. Specifically, Congress made it "explicit that no
conditions to membership may be imposed except as respects periodic dues, initiation fees, and as-
sessments." Id. at 238 (quoting § 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act). The Court reserved
judgment on the situation where "exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments (are) used as a
cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First Amendment."
Id. The Abood Court squarely faced this question.
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quences of the ratepayers' failure to pay might be even more severe.42 At
the least, the employees theoretically had the option of seeking alterna-
tive employment; ratepayers cannot seek an alternative utility.43
The Cahill court rapidly dispensed with the utilities' argument that
the Commission's order did not violate the ratepayer's first amendment
rights because no one could ever personally identify the ratepayer with
any of the utilities' charitable contributions.' The court found that this
argument erroneously assumed that an unconstitutional compulsion of
speech occurs only when a reasonable third party would associate the
individual with the repugnant message.45 The court concluded that the
proper issue was whether the ratepayer reasonably regarded the dona-
tions as a coerced affirmation of an ideology that he opposed.46 Thus, the
association of the ratepayer with the donation by the donee or any third
42. Cahill 556 N.E.2d at 133, 136.
43. Id. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Otter Tail Power Co., see supra note 15, ratepay-
ers are not completely without recourse if they wish to terminate service from their local utility.
Similarly, dissident employees may also seek another union. However, unless the dissident employ-
ees get a majority of the bargaining unit to agree with them, and unless ratepayers can convince their
town to switch power companies, these alternatives do not alleviate first amendment concerns.
44. Cahill, 556 N.E.2d at 133, 136. At least one commentator has argued that the right not to
speak (the negative first amendment right, see supra note 33) is not infringed unless some nexus
exists between the individual and the compelled message. Gaebler, supra note 33, at 1016. Professor
Gaebler contends that the negative first amendment right protects individuals from two distinct
harms: (1) the harm to an individual forced to project to the world ideas that are anathema to him;
and (2) the harm to the individual's own conscience from his forced association with a repugnant
message. Id. at 1004, 1016. Gaebler argues that "(e)ventually a point is reached where the level of
personal involvement is so minimal and the resulting nexus between the individual and the message
is so remote that no legally cognizable infringement of negative first amendment rights occurs." Id.
at 1014.
The Cahill court rejected the nexus argument, at least as it applies to the second type of injury
that Professor Gaebler described. See infra text accompnaying notes 43-45.
45. Cahill, 556 N.E.2d at 133, 136.
46. Id. Compare Professor Cantor's view that, in forced payment cases, "Itihe critical constitu-
tional issue at stake is government establishment of particular political causes." Cantor, Forced
Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36
RUTGERS L. REv. 3, 7 (1983). Professor Cantor contends that "moral affront or upset to conscience
from being used as a financial instrument is not, by itself, a serious constitutional injury." Id. at 25
(footnote omitted). Professor Cantor apparently asserts that the nexus between the speaker and the
compelled offensive message is, without more, irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. Compare
Gaebler, supra note 33.
Thus, three distinct views concerning the negative freedom-of-conscience right emerge. At one
end of the spectrum lies the Cahill opinion, which holds that forced payments to support causes
anathema to the payor are per se unconstitutional absent a compelling state interest. At the other
end lies Professor Cantor's view that such payments are per se constitutional if the plaintiff alleges
that the payments wound his conscience. Professor Gaebler's view lies somewhere in between. Un-
like Cantor, Gaebler believes that harm to one's own conscience by itself is enough to find a constitu-
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party is irrelevant.47
The court also rejected the utilities' alternative argument that their
charitable donations were "germane" to their business conduct. 48 The
New York Court of Appeals observed that only a compelling interest
could justify an infringement upon an individual's first amendment
rights.49 The court explained that, under Abood, "germane" expenses
were those the state had a compelling interest in retrieving from the indi-
vidual.50 For purposes of analyzing utility expenses, the court expanded
Abood, holding that "germane" utility expenses are those relating to both
"the reasonable cost of doing business and to the provision of utility serv-
ices."51 The utilities, however, failed to demonstrate this compelling in-
terest because they did not show that the charitable donations at issue
were reasonable and necessary.52
The court also rejected the utilities' assertion that their charitable do-
nations violated ratepayer's first amendment rights no more than the
government's spending of tax dollars on programs offensive to taxpay-
ers.53 The majority observed that to accept the utilities' argument would
be tantamount to accepting the assumption that the state had delegated
to public utilities the power to tax.54 The court held that such a delega-
tional violation. However, unlike the Cahill opinion, Gaebler would require the payor to establish
nexus between the payor and the repugnant message.
47. Cahill, 556 N.E.2d at 133, 136. The court believed the framers sought to prevent com-
pelled speech, not merely observed compelled speech. Id.
48. Id. Cahill v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 147 A.D.2d, 542 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1989).
49. Cahill, 556 N.E.2d at 137.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The court observed that "the effects of this gossamer civic goodwill on the elementary
provision of utility services are at best speculative, and at worst clearly not a sufficient basis upon
which to compromise first amendment freedoms held by so many affected persons."
53. Cahill 556 N.E.2d at 133, 137-38. This apparent reductio ad absurdum argument also
failed to impress the concurring judge, but for different reasons than the majority. See infra note 9.
54. Cahill 556 N.E.2d at 133, 137-38. The court observed that to allow the government to
delegate to preferred agents the power of taxation to support the beliefs of those agents would under-
mine "the doctrinal integrity of first amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 138.
The concurring judge disagreed with the majority's resolution of the delegation problem. Id. at
138-40 (Titone, J., concurring). The concurrence argued that the Commission's order effectively
delegated taxation power to the utilities. Accordingly, the concurrence would have struck the order
on that ground. Furthermore, the concurrence observed that voters may remedy objectionable tax
policies with their ballots, while ratepayers have no similar recourse. Id. at 140. Thus, when a
utility has the power to tax, a "taxation without representation" problem arises. Id. Note that this
reasoning is similar to that used in several other state courts to invalidate utilities' charges of polit-
ical expenditures to ratepayers. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. However, these
courts never explicitly relied on a constitutional rationale. Rather, they found the idea of an invol.
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tion would be unconstitutional.
The Cahill decision provides courts and ratepayers another potent
weapon with which to prevent allocations of a utility's charitable, polit-
ical, and lobbying expenditures to ratepayers. 5" The decision establishes
an opening through which a ratepayer may bring a constitutional chal-
lenge to public utility expenditures, increasing the likelihood that state
and local utilities will be fighting battles over operating expenses in fed-
eral court. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the decision signals
an implicit recognition that courts will not let public utilities abuse their
unique position.
On the other hand, the decision may represent a major blow to private
charities.56 In contrast to the corporate obligation theory of expenditure
allocation, which recognizes a utility's duty of generosity to its commu-
nity,57 the Cahill approach discourages utilities from making charitable
donations. Many public utilities have attempted to shoulder the burden
left by shrivelling government aid programs; this task now will be even
more difficult to achieve. Consequently, while the Cahill decision may
represent more power to the people, it may also have pulled the plug on
some of the thousand points of light.
Richard P. Johnson
untary levy so offensive that they refused to allow it. These decisions had more of an equitable than
a constitutional flavor.
55. See supra notes 8-28 and accompanying text.
56. Several charitable organizations filed amicus curiae briefs urging reversal of the lower
court's holding, including the New York Mission Society, the United Way of New York, the New
York Public Library, and the New York Blood Center.
57. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
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